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CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Margaret M. O'Neil'
"'I know of no principle in the preservation of which all are more
concerned. I know none, by undermining which, life, liberty and property,
might be more endangered. It is therefore incumbent on courts to be
watchful of every inroad on a principle so truly important. ""
Chief Justice John Marshall's subject was the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause.2 The fundamental fairness of the idea that one
has the right to hear accusations forthrightly from those who make them
resonates from the schoolyard to the courtroom. In legal proceedings, it
is considered a "bedrock procedural guarantee,"3 distinguishing modern
tribunals from the Star Chamber inquisitions relegated to an
unenlightened period in history.4
The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence during the
last fifty years has neglected the Chief Justice's admonition as the Court
veered between competing perspectives.5  Arguably, the dominant
perspective has placed primacy on the Clause's "truth seeking goals,"
identifying actual face-to-face confrontation to be a "preference" rather
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1. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1377 (2004) (emphasis added)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas.
187, 193 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694)).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .
3. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359.
4. See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause:
A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 568-74 (1992). The
author explains the English antecedents to the American Confrontation Clause. Id. She
notes in particular that "[i]n Star Chamber proceedings, the accused could be committed
to prison indefinitely [without] trial . . .required to swear ... [to] answer all questions
truthfully ... even though he was ordinarily not informed of the charges against him, nor
allowed counsel . . . [and] was confronted with interrogatories based on information
furnished through ... secret examinations." Id. at 570 n.51 (internal citation omitted).
5. See Cornelius M. Murphy, Note, Justice Scalia and the Confrontation Clause: A
Case Study in Originalist Adjudication of Individual Rights, 34 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1243,
1243 (1997). The author focuses on Justice Scalia's originalist approach to the
Confrontation Clause and compares it with the interpretation other members of the Court
apply. Id. at 1244.
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than a command, so long as other indices of reliability are available.6
The other perspective looks to the historical foundations of the Clause as
a safeguard against the power of the state to coerce testimonial evidence
and to preserve a defendant's categorical right to confrontation.' The
conflict between these two strains has left the lower courts struggling to
find a framework for adjudicating Confrontation Clause challenges
amidst Supreme Court rulings that have become "less coherent, more
fractured, and less predictable."8
The Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington9 marks theS• • 10
ascendancy of the originalist approach, providing a bright-line rule for a
large class of Confrontation Clause cases-those involving the use of out-
of-court testimonial statements." In Crawford, the Court overruled
precedent by holding that use of prior testimony of an absent witness
against a defendant where there had been no opportunity for cross-
examination violated the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. 2
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia noted that "the principal evil at
6. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849 (1990) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,
63 (1980)).
7. Murphy, supra note 5, at 1247-49.
8. Ruth L. Friedman, Comment, The Confrontation Clause in Search of a Paradigm:
Has Public Policy Trumped the Constitution?, 22 PACE L. REV. 455, 457 (2002); see also
Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v.
Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87 (2003). Professor Kirst provides a comprehensive
analysis of appellate court treatment of Confrontation Clause challenges after the
Supreme Court's ruling in the Confrontation Clause case proceeding in Crawford. Id. In
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999), the Court heard a challenge to a Virginia Supreme
Court decision permitting use of a custodial confession by the defendant's brother
inculpating the defendant, id. at 121-22. The brother later refused to testify, claiming his
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. Id. at 121. The state court relied
on the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rules to allow the
testimony. Id. at 121-123. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, agreeing that the
use of the statement violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 139-40. However, the
decision was only a plurality opinion because the justices failed to reach consensus on a
rationale. Id. at 120. All of the justices did agree that custodial confessions should be
treated differently than private confessions. Compare Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131-40 (opinion of
Stevens, J.) (explaining that a suspect's statements while in custody lack veracity because
he knows that anything he says can be used against him), with id. at 143 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (referring to a custodial interrogation as a "paradigmatic Confrontation
Clause violation").
9. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
10. Id. at 1362-68; see Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1085 (1989). Professor Farber defines originalists as
those justices and judges who "are committed to the view that original intent is not only
relevant but authoritative, that we are in some sense obligated to follow the intent of the
framers." Id. at 1086; see also Murphy, supra note 5, at 1265-66.
11. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1373-74.
12. Id.
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which the Confrontation Clause was directed was... [the] use of ex parte
examinations as evidence against the accused."' 3
The seven justice majority in Crawford suggests future stability in the
Court's treatment of the Confrontation Clause. 4 Yet this consensus may
prove illusory.'5 Crawford left several potentially divisive questions
unanswered that are likely to come to a head due to American
counterterrorism policies." Not surprisingly, the courts will face these
issues when adjudicating the fate of enemy combatants held under U.S.
control and when prosecuting terrorist suspects captured within our
borders.' Indeed, one month after Crawford, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit ruled in United States v. Moussaoui8 that a
defendant's right to present witnesses in his own defense was satisfied by
the presentation of government provided summaries of ex parte
statements made to federal officers.' 9
This Comment will explore the potential impact of Crawford on
terrorism cases. Part I, Section A presents a review of the
"unsatisfactory state, 2 of the law leading up to Crawford regarding the
admissibility of hearsay evidence under the Confrontation Clause.
Section B discusses the Court's ruling in Crawford, focusing on the
welcome clarity it provided. Section C then looks at the weighty
questions Crawford left unanswered. Part II examines the Confrontation
Clause within the legal landscape of the Court's emerging post-
September 11 jurisprudence. Specifically, this section uses the Supreme
Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld2' and the episodic proceedings in
the Fourth Circuit surrounding Moussaoui to assess how issues raised in
these cases fit within the Court's current interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause. Part II then examines the tension between the
demands of the Confrontation Clause as articulated in Crawford and the
13. Id. at 1363.
14. See Edwin Chemerinsky, Court Bars Out-of-Court 'Testimonial' Statements,
TRIAL, July 2004, at 82, 85 (2004).
15. See id. at 84-85.
16. See Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores
Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, 5.
17. See generally Joshua L. Dratel, The Impact of Crawford v. Washington on
Terrorism Prosecutions, CHAMPION, Sept.iOct., 2004, WL 28-OCT Champion 19
(discussing the impact of Crawford on military tribunal proceedings). See also Joseph
Kubler, U.S. Citizens as Enemy Combatants, Indication of a Roll-Back of Civil Liberties or
a Sign of our Jurisprudential Evolution?, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 631
(analyzing the legal authority to invoke enemy combatant status as applied to American
citizens).
18. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
19. Id. at 479-81.
20. Friedman, supra note 16, at 6.
21. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
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need to protect national security interests. Part IV will argue that, read
within the Court's handling of fair trial rights, Crawford does not permit
the type of crime charged to serve as an excuse for abridging Sixth
Amendment protections. This Comment concludes that the Constitution
provides the means to reconcile the defendant's interests with national
security concerns.
I. GRAPPLING WITH THE CONTOURS OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. From Mattox to Roberts: The Road to Ambiguity
The right to confront one's accusers has "a lineage that traces back to
the beginnings of Western legal culture."22 Historians record that it was
added to the Bill of Rights as a bulwark against the abuses of the Crown
23
in English history and in the American colonies.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that the Confrontation
Clause was designed to avoid procedural unfairness, such as "'trial[s] by
affidavit' . . . convictions secured through 'flagrant abuses[] . .
anonymous accusers, and absentee witnesses.' ' 24 The rationale is that
witnesses who may have incentives to provide damning testimony to
police or other state authorities behind closed doors may find it more
difficult to make false claims when face-to-face with the defendant.
25
Like most procedural guarantees, the Confrontation Clause also
enhances truth finding.26  The Clause endorses cross-examination to
22. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988). Justice Scalia noted that "there is
something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confrontation between accused
and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution."' Id. at 1017 (quoting
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965)). Drawing on Coy, Justice Breyer noted in Lilly
v. Virginia that the right of the accused to directly confront his accusers finds support in
The Bible, Shakespeare's Richard II and Henry VIII, laws adopted under King Edward VI
in 1552 and Queen Elizabeth in 1558, as well as a treatise dating from 1662. Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140-41 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
23. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1359-63 (2004); see also Berger, supra
note 4, at 579. The author recounts that the 1765 Stamp Act allowed the vice-admiralty
courts "to sit without juries and to examine witnesses in chambers." Id. In 1768 the
advocate general relied on such ex parte evidence to sue John Hancock in Admiralty
Court for allegedly smuggling wine. Id. n.94. Defense counsel John Adams and the
colonial newspapers railed against the use of secretly obtained testimony. Id.
Contemporaneously, the English Parliament required all colonists accused of treason to be
tried in England, thereby assuring witness unavailability and testimony by deposition. Id.
24. Murphy, supra note 5, at 1248.
25. Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 688-89
(1996).
26. Id. The author explains that the Confrontation Clause is "intermesh[ed]" with
other Sixth Amendment rights that are "designed to promote the truth," specifically
public trial and compulsory process rights. Id. But cf. Berger, supra note 4, at 572-73. The
author points out that the right of confrontation was asserted originally in the seventeenth
1080
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subject the witness's claims to the crucible of adversarial testing. 7
Exposing the demeanor of the witness further enhances the jury's ability
to weigh the reliability of the evidence the witness provides.
The confrontation right is not absolute.29 The first Supreme Court case
addressing the Confrontation Clause was Mattox v. United States" in
1895. In Mattox, the Court allowed in a second trial the introduction of
stenographic notes from the prior testimony of subsequently deceased
witnesses.3" The Court rested its decision on a hearsay exception
allowing the admission of testimony from an unavailable witness taken at
a prior proceeding at which the defendant had an opportunity for cross-
examination.3 The Court drew an analogy to the exception allowing the
admission of dying declarations.33
The common law recognized both exceptions cited in Mattox when the
Sixth Amendment was drafted,34 based on the doctrine of necessity (the
unavailability of the witness) as a threshold requirement. The pursuit of
truth, the Court said, required that "general rules of law of this kind,
however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case. .,36
century state trials to counter the effects of secrecy and the English Crown's power, rather
than the inability to cross-examine witnesses. Id. Much later, evolving theories of
evidence introduced cross-examination as a powerful means of testing veracity. Id.
Berger ties this latter development to the appearance of lawyers in the eighteenth century
to represent defendants. !d. Confrontation rights and the Rules of Evidence firmly
entwined after lawyers were statutorily allowed in felony cases in 1836, although the
practice started a century earlier. Id. at 577.
27. Carol A. Chase, The Five Faces of the Confrontation Clause, 40 Hous. L. REV.
1003, 1017 (2003) (noting that in Craig, the Court found "four elements of confrontation
which serve the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. .. : (1) the physical presence of the
witness; (2) ... testimony . . . under oath; (3) cross-examination of the witness by defense
counsel; and (4) observation of witness demeanor by the jury"). Id.
28. Id. at 1011.
29. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 844 (1990) (asserting that "the Confrontation
Clause [does not] guarantee[] criminal defendants the absolute right to a face-to-face
meeting with witnesses against them at trial").
30. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
31. Chase, supra note 27, at 1038.
32. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
33. Id.
34. Chase, supra note 27, at 1039.
35. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 237, 244; see Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365-66
(2004).
36. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
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1. A Command Once So Clear
Although grounded in established Sixth Amendment exceptions, the
Court's public policy rationale foreshadowed a split in the Court over the
scope of the confrontation requirement.3 7  The Mattox Court also
emphasized a case specific analysis that, taken to the extreme,
undermined durable rules.38
The Court's inconsistency is most notable in cases involving the
admission of hearsay. 39  Following Mattox, the Court categorically
disallowed "written evidence adverse to the defendant" unless it was
accompanied by a witness who could be confronted in court." Yet
adopting this literal interpretation of the Confrontation Clause required
barring all hearsay, undermining the truth finding function of the
Clause.4' The Court then sought to "'stee[r] a middle course,"' 42 finding
admissible prior testimony of a witness unavailable to testify at trial when
the accused had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 59-69.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 42-71.
39. Chase, supra note 27, at 1043. Chase indicates that by 1970, the Court had heard
a large number of Confrontation Clause challenges to the admission of hearsay, but failed
to "articulat[e] a unifying principle or principles to determine generally the effect of the
Confrontation Clause on the admissibility of hearsay evidence against all criminal
defendants." Id.
40. Friedman, supra note 8, at 472.
41. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. The Court, for example, has held that the hearsay
exception for co-conspirator statements does not violate the Confrontation Clause, nor, as
discussed in Mattox, do dying declarations. See, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
396 (1986) ("The admission of co-conspirators' declarations into evidence ... actually
furthers the 'Confrontation Clause's very mission' which is to [promote] 'the accuracy of
the truth-determining process in criminal trials."' (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 415 (1985) (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 89 (1970)); see also Lilly v. Virginia. 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1939) (noting the "long history
of admitting such statements"); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987)
(rejecting defendant's argument that admission of co-conspirator statements violated his
Confrontation Clause rights).
42. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 68 n.9. (1980)).
43. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1374 (2004). In Barber v. Paige, 390
U.S. 719 (1968), the Court reaffirmed the requirement that a prosecutor must show that
the witness was unavailable before his or her testimony from a preliminary hearing could
be admitted, even if the witness had been cross-examined at the prior proceeding, id. at
724-26. Similarly, the Court in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), allowed testimony
from a preliminary hearing even though the witness subsequently recanted her statement,
id. at 164. A witness who testified at the trial admitted making the statements, and was
cross-examined regarding both his testimony and preliminary hearing testimony; this
satisfied Confrontation Clause demands. See Chase, supra note 27, at 1043.
1082
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2. Mired in Exceptions
The Court began to move onto new ground in Ohio v. Roberts,"4 where
it abandoned a per se requirement for direct confrontation as a
constitutionally prescribed method for determining reliability.45 Truth-
finding remained a core value of the Confrontation Clause, but the
defendant's categorical right to confront the witness was now seen as
only one means of assessing whether the testimony was reliable.46 The
Confrontation Clause was treated more like a rule of evidence than a
constitutional demand.47
In Roberts, the Court articulated a two-prong test for determining the
reliability of testimony.48 The first prong was the familiar rule of
necessity, "requir[ing] the prosecutor to either produce, or demonstrate
the unavailability of, the person whose out-of-court statement the
prosecutor wished to use against a criminal defendant., 49 The second
prong expanded the options for demonstrating reliability.0 Once the
witness's unavailability was established, the statement would be
admissible if it had "adequate 'indicia of reliability,' [which could] be
inferred . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception . . . [or with] a showing of particularized guarantees of
44. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts, the defendant was charged with check forgery and
possession of stolen credit cards. Id. at 58. During a preliminary hearing, his attorney
called the victim's daughter as a witness and attempted to get her to admit that she had
given the checkbook and credit cards to the defendant without telling him that she did not
have permission to use them. Id. At trial, the prosecution successfully admitted the
daughter's prior testimony into the record based on a state law hearsay exception
"permit[ting] the use of preliminary examination testimony of a witness who 'cannot for
any reason be produced at trial."' Id. at 59 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49
(1975)).
45. Id. at 62-65; Chase, supra note 27, at 1043-44.
46. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 n.6 (discussing the interplay between cross-examination,
the oath, adversarial setting, and the demeanor of the witness to determine reliability).
47. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 8, at 477 (noting that "[tihe Court clearly
articulated the policy driving this balancing test: 'every jurisdiction has a strong interest in
effective law enforcement, and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of
evidence applicable in criminal proceedings"' (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64)).
48. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; see also Chase, supra note 27, at 1043-47 (describing
the Roberts test).
49. Chase, supra note 27, at 1044-45.
50. Id. at 1045-46. While treated in Roberts as a conjunctive test, subsequent rulings
made clear that the reliability prong was the "primary condition" because the
unavailability of the declarant was only required if the out-of-court statement was
testimonial. See id. at 1051-52 (discussing United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986)); see
also Friedman, supra note 16, at 5 (noting that "[t]he primary condition to be satisfied
[under Roberts] was that the statement be reliable").
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trustworthiness., 51 What was meant by a "firmly rooted hearsay
exception" or "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" remained
"amorphous., 52
Roberts set the stage for a confrontation within the Court over the
"irreducible demands" of the Confrontation Clause." Justice Scalia's
originalist view required direct confrontation between the accused and a
witness offering adverse testimonial statements.54 Justice O'Connor,
conversely, argued that this was a constitutional "preference" that "may
give way... to other competing interests." 5
The dichotomy within the Court is most clear in two cases-Coy v.565
Iowa56 and Maryland v. Craig57 -involving procedural techniques to
51. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Compare White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992)
(allowing spontaneous declarations and statements made for medical treatment as a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception), with Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (finding
that a residual hearsay exception was by definition not "firmly rooted" because it requires
a case specific, ad hoc assessment of the circumstances in which the statement was made).
Although the Court established the firmly rooted hearsay exception in Roberts, the
witness in that case in fact had been subject to defense counsel's adversarial questioning.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. Called as a defense witness in the preliminary proceedings, the
witness refused defense counsel's persistent efforts to get her to admit to her earlier claim
that she gave the credit cards and checkbook to the defendant without telling him that she
did not have permission to use them. Id. While the opportunity for cross-examination
was not directly at issue in Roberts, the Court nonetheless took the opportunity in its
opinion to rule that mere opportunity for cross-examination was sufficient. Id. at 70.
52. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1371 (2004). In Lilly v. Virginia, the
Court said a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception was found when "'longstanding judicial
and legislative experience' indicated that the statement "'rest[s] on such [a] solid
foundatio[n] that admission of virtually any evidence within [it] comports with the
'substance of the constitutional protection."' 527 U.S. 116, 126 (1999) (alterations in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 817); Roberts,
448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)). This standard
provides little specific guidance to lower courts, except to indicate that one factor is the
length of time the exception has been recognized. See id. Yet, how long was sufficient and
what was needed to find an adequately solid foundation remained ambiguous. Friedman,
supra note 16, at 6 (noting that the lower courts "strained" to follow the Court's
guidelines, but reached far different results on analogous facts).
53. See infra text accompanying notes 59-67.
54. Compare Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988) ("We have never doubted,
therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting
with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."), with Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374
("Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to
satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation.").
55. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1024 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The Court has time and again stated that the Clause 'reflects a preference
for face-to-face confrontation at trial,' and expressly recognized that this preference may
be overcome in a particular case if close examination of 'competing interests' so warrants."
(quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64)).
56. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
1084
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protect child witnesses from the trauma of testifying before their alleged
abusers." Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Coy, reasserting that the
"the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face
meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."59
That Justice Scalia's opinion was only a pyrrhic victory became evident
two years later when Justice O'Connor drafted the Court's opinion in
Craig. Writing for a five to four majority in Craig,6° she reasserted that
face-to-face confrontation was "not the sine qua non of the... right, 6' as
long as there were other means of testing reliability. 2
Justice O'Connor advocated a case-specific inquiry to show that
foregoing direct confrontation with the defendant was necessary to
protect a sufficiently important public interest.63 She noted that a
significant majority of state legislatures enacted procedures allowing
children to avoid direct interaction with their alleged abusers, and the
Court should not second-guess their considered judgment.
57. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
58. Craig, 497 U.S. at 841-43; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014-15. The defendants in both cases
were charged with child abuse, but the procedures used to shield child-witnesses differed.
State law in Coy permitted a screen to be placed at trial between the accused and the child
witnesses. 487 U.S. at 1014. The defendant could dimly see the children after the
courtroom lights were lowered, but the children could not see the defendant. Id. at 1014-
15. Defense counsel was able to cross-examine the witnesses, and the judge and jury could
see their demeanor as they answered questions. Id. The defendant in Craig challenged
the use of one-way closed circuit television to prevent the child witness from having to
testify in his presence. 497 U.S. at 840-42. The prosecutor and defense counsel questioned
the witness while in the same room with her, but the judge, jury, and the defendant
remained in the courtroom. Id. at 841. The defendant and the jury could see the witness's
demeanor from a video monitor when she answered questions; she, however, could not see
the defendant. Id. at 841-42.
59. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1016. Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Court had found
exceptions to rights deemed implicit in the Clause, citing the general exclusion of hearsay
and the right to face-to-face confrontation at points other than at trial. Id. at 1020.
However, he said that was far different than finding exceptions to the "irreducible literal
meaning of the Clause: 'a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence
at trial."' Id. at 1021 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). Foreshadowing the position she would take in Craig, Justice O'Connor
wrote separately "only to note [her] view that [the right to face to face confrontation was]
not absolute, but rather may give way . . . to other competing interests." Id. at 1022
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. Craig, 497 U.S. at 838.
61. Id. at 847.
62. Id. at 853-54. In Justice O'Connor's opinion, physical presence, oath, cross-
examination, and demeanor together "ensur[e] that evidence admitted against an accused
is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of Anglo-
American criminal proceedings." Id. at 846.
63. Id. at 844-45, 857-58.
64. Id. at 855. Justice Scalia, joined by the remaining justices from the Coy majority,
categorically rejected the Court's holding. Id. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Coy v. Iowa,
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 54:1077
Craig bolstered the use of the Roberts test as a framework for assessing
Confrontation Clause challenges,6 but state and lower federal courts
struggled to find coherence in its application. 66 Even the Supreme Court
had difficulty finding consensus when applying the test.
67
B. Reasserting the Constitutional Command
The procedural history of Crawford v. Washington6 highlighted the
lack of coherent guidelines to apply the reliability prong of the Roberts
test.69 Michael Crawford was charged with assault and attempted murder
after attacking a man who allegedly attempted to rape his wife, Sylvia °.7
Both Sylvia and Michael made recorded confessions to the police shortly
after the attack.7 Sylvia was unavailable to testify at Michael's trial
because of Washington's spousal privilege law, prohibiting the testimony
487 U.S. 1012, 1013 (1988). He scathingly asserted that "[s]eldom has this Court failed so
conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of
prevailing current opinion." Craig, 497 U.S. at 860. Justice Scalia asserted that "the
Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial
procedures that were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was
'face-to-face' confrontation." id. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting). By treating equally the
Clause's explicit and implicit means for determining reliability, the Court "abstracts from
the right to its purposes, and then eliminates the right." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
65. See Chase, supra note 27, at 1017.
66. See Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. RFv. 537, 617-
18 (2003). Writing before the Crawford decision, the author argued that the Court's
Confrontation Clause rulings were both "confusing and inconsistent." Id. at 617. She
advocated "[a] more easily understood and universal approach to ease the burden of trial
and appellate judges" and lawyers "on both sides of the criminal justice system." Id.; see
also Friedman, supra note 8, at 501-05. Friedman notes that by the early 1990s, the
Court's Confrontation Clause rulings were "muddied waters." Id. at 490. While Justices
Scalia and Thomas advocated originalist approaches, Justice O'Connor, sometimes joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, still looked to a Roberts-based standard, broadening
Confrontation Clause standards to either "protect[] vulnerable witnesses (as in Craig)" or
developing "other methods of ensuring reliability." Id. The other justices vacillated
between the two schools of thought, "offer[ing] little guidance for future decisions, either
in lower courts or for the Supreme Court itself." Id.
67. See Joshua C. Dickinson, The Confrontation Clause and the Hearsay Rule: The
Current State of a Failed Marriage in Need of a Quick Divorce, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV.
763, 765 (2000). Dickinson describes the justices following the Lilly ruling as "discordant."
Id. He notes that in Lilly, the justices wrote four separate concurring opinions. Id. at 795-
96; see also Friedman, supra note 8, at 505 (noting that although the Court in Lilly
heightened Confrontation Clause standards by disallowing co-conspirator statements, "the
circuits [were still] left to develop their own rules of law, providing little sense of
precedent or reliability for those who follow").
68. 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
69. Id. at 1372-73.
70. Id. at 1356-57.
71. State v. Crawford, 54 P.3d 656, 658 (Wash. 2002), rev'd sub nor. Crawford v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
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of one spouse without the other's consent. 7' However, the court allowed
the prosecutor to use Sylvia's recorded statements based on a state
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest and the
"sufficient indicia of reliability" standard of the Roberts test.73
The Washington Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and
reversed Michael's conviction, concluding that Sylvia's testimony lacked
the requisite indicia.74 Finally, the Washington Supreme Court reinstated
the conviction because, in its judgment, "the interlock[]" between the
two confessions enhanced the reliability of her statement. 5
On certiorari, the Supreme Court chose not to join sides in the
Washington state courts' oscillating assessments regarding the
trustworthiness of Sylvia's statement, but instead broke with the Roberts
test altogether.76 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia found that the
lesson of Crawford is that the "[Roberts] framework is so unpredictable
that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core
confrontation violations., 77  Sylvia's statements to the police were
precisely the type of ex parte statement the Framers enjoined."'
Justice Scalia notes that the Constitutional text is insufficient to define
the scope of Confrontation Clause demands.79 History showed that "the
principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the...
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused."
' 0
Recalling the Framers' knowledge of English history and the Crown's
infamous use of ex parte statements against the American colonies,
Justice Scalia argued that the Framers "would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at
72. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (2001)). The Washington statute states
that
[a] husband shall not be examined for or against his wife, without the consent of
the wife, nor a wife for or against her husband without the consent of the
husband; nor can either during marriage or afterward, be without the consent of
the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during
marriage.
Id.
73. Id. at 663.
74. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1358 (2004).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1372-74.
77. Id. at 1371.
78. Id. at 1365 n.4. Compare Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171. 173-74 (1987),
where the court allowed tape recorded co-conspirator statements because such statements
are not considered hearsay under FED. R. EVID. 804(d)(2)(E).
79. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1359. According to Justice Scalia, the term "witnesses
against" may plausibly mean "those who actually testify at trial, those whose statements
are offered at trial, or something in-between." Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 1363.
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trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination."8 '  Rejecting the Roberts
approach, Justice Scalia affirmed that "[w]here testimonial statements
are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation.,
82
C. Crawford's Unanswered Questions
While the Court's opinion in Crawford brought clarity to the
requirements for admitting some hearsay, the Court failed to address
83
significant questions. Justice Scalia's acknowledged failure to define
"testimonial statements" received the greatest scrutiny from practitioners
and academics 84 and is likely to "plague judges for years.,
85
Crawford provided some guidance for identifying "[v]arious
formulations of [the] core class of 'testimonial' statements. 8 6  The
presumably nonexclusive formulations Justice Scalia provides are:
ex parte [statements] . . . such as affidavits, custodial
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine ... ; extra-judicial statements ... contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as .. .depositions, prior
81. Id. at 1363-65. Justice Scalia points out that the Framers added the Confrontation
Clause to the Bill of Rights to rectify its omission from the Constitution. Id. at 1362-63.
Moreover, many state declarations of rights adopted in the Revolutionary period
guaranteed a defendant the right to confront adverse witnesses. Id.; see also Berger, supra
note 4, at 583-85 nn.108-13 (discussing Anti-federalist argument that a confrontation right
was necessary to "curb tyranny"). Professor Berger notes that George Mason raised
similar concerns during ratification of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Id. at 584-86.
82- Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.
83. Friedman, supra note 16, at 8-10.
84. Id. at 9-11; see also Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted
and Transformed, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439, 456, WL 2004 CATOSCTR 439
(commenting that "the boundaries of the category lof testimonial statements] will have to
be marked out by future cases"); The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Leading Cases, 118
HARV. L. REV. 316,321 (2004), WL 118 HVLR 316 (noting that "even as it concluded that
the Confrontation Clause was directed primarily at testimonial statements, the decision
did not define what constitutes testimony").
85. Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 82. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the omission "casts a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal
trials in both federal and state courts." Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment). While Justice Scalia suggests that Confrontation Clause
protection may apply only to testimonial statements, the opinion refrains from adopting
that position. See id. at 1374. He focuses instead on what is required when testimonial
statements- whatever they may be-are at issue. Id. at 1373-74. A number of
commentators suggest that Justice Scalia may have avoided a precise definition as a
compromise for unanimity in the Court's judgment. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 16, at
13.
86. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
1088 [Vol. 54:1077
2005] Implications for the War on Terrorism 1089
testimony, or confessions; and statements that were made [with
the reasonable expectation that they] would be available for use
at a later trial.87
Statements made to police officers during interrogation presumably fit
within all three categories "under even a narrow standard ... [because
they] bear a striking resemblance" to the specific types of ex parte
statements the Framers found repugnant.88
Crawford also fails to provide a standard by which to judge the
sufficiency of an opportunity for cross-examination.9 The testimonial
approach adopted in Crawford "demands . . . a prior opportunity for
cross-examination" before an absent witness's testimony may be
admitted at trial. 90 Yet the Court did not definitively answer whether
depositions, interrogatories, or similar techniques satisfy the sufficient
opportunity for cross-examination test.9'
Finally, the testimonial approach the Court adopted may indicate
when a witness qualifies as unavailable to testify at trial.9 Under Roberts
and its progeny, the Court developed a body of case law regarding the
87. Friedman, supra note 16, at 9 (third omission in original) (internal quotations
marks and citations omitted); see Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364.
88. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. Moreover, the Court's previous rulings indicate that
a finding that the statements were taken without intent to use them in a future prosecution
does not immunize them from Confrontational Clause challenges. See, e.g., White v.
Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1992). Justice Thomas's concurrence in White focused on
the form of the statements rather than the circumstances under which it was taken. Id. at
364 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He argued that
"[a]ttempts to draw a line between statements made in contemplation of legal proceedings
and those not so made would entangle the courts in a multitude of difficulties." Id.
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In language Justice
Scalia would mirror in Crawford, Justice Thomas would apply a stricter standard to
"formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions." Id. at 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
89. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70 (1980). In Roberts, the Court suggested in
dicta that "the opportunity to cross-examine [the witness] ... satisfies the Confrontation
Clause." Id. But cf Friedman, supra note 16, at 11 (describing scenarios raising whether
the accused's opportunity to cross-examine was adequate).
90. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.
91. Chase, supra note 27, at 1056-57. This is of particular concern in child abuse
cases, where, over Justice Scalia's dissent, the Court has shown greater flexibility in
according child-witnesses alternative ways to testify short of facing their alleged abuser.
See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text. In the aftermath of Crawford, resolution of
these opposing standards may limit use of alternative methods for providing testimony.
Recently in Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. 2004), the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals cited Crawford in overturning a conviction where the trial court used a state
tender-age hearsay exception to admit the child's prior statements to a social worker in
lieu of her testimony, id. at 42-43.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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adequacy of proof for unavailability. 93 While usually requiring that the
prosecutor explore all avenues to produce the witness, the Court's ruling
in Mancusi v. Stubbs94 set the outer perimeter. In Mancusi, the Court
concluded that use of prior testimony of a witness living in a foreign
country did not violate the Confrontation Clause.96
Mancusi may not apply to witnesses held abroad under U.S. custody."
The jurisdiction of federal courts may reach these witnesses because the
subpoena issues against the detainee's custodian, so long as that
custodian is a U.S. citizen.9Y It is only when that custodian defies the
subpoena that the witnesses become "unavailable."99
II. CRAWFORD AND THE COURT'S POST SEPTEMBER 11 JURISPRUDENCE
Two cases illustrate how the Court might apply Crawford in terrorism
prosecutions: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld'°l and United States v. Moussaoui"'
Hamdi provides a specific test of the Court's treatment of out-of-court
testimonial statements in a U.S. citizen's challenge to his detention as an
enemy combatant.' 2 A more comprehensive examination of Crawford
comes from the proceedings in Moussaoui, which address access to the
testimony of enemy combatants who may have exculpatory evidence."3
While the Sixth Amendment's mirror right to compulsory process' 4 is the
93. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 8.
94. 408 U.S. 204, 209, 216 (1972) (finding that a witness who testified at a prior
hearing but was now living in Sweden was unavailable because he was beyond the court's
process powers).
95. Friedman, supra note 16, at 8.
96. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 212-13.
97. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 465 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3556 (2005).
98. Id.
99. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 463-64; cf Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004)
(finding that a district court has jurisdiction over the habeas claims of alien detainees held
at Guantanamo Bay, where the United States has exclusive and plenary jurisdiction, but
not ultimate sovereignty).
100. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
101. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (2005).
102. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635-39 (plurality opinion). In the aftermath of the Supreme
Court's ruling, discussed supra, Hamdi's habeas action was dismissed. Stipulation of
Dismissal, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D.Va. 2002) (No. 2:02CV439). He
agreed as part of a settlement with the Government to renounce his U.S. citizenship after
being deported to Saudi Arabia. Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S, Releases Saudi-
American It had Captured in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at A15. Nonetheless,
his case is illustrative of the standard the Court may apply in considering the admissibility
of unchallenged hearsay in enemy combatant hearings.
103. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458.
104. Id. at 483 (Gregory, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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focus in Moussaoui, the admission of testimonial hearsay also implicates
Crawford considerations 05
A. Hamdi-Exigencies of War and Testimonial Hearsay
Hamdi provides a window on how the Court is likely to apply
Crawford in determining whether the submission of an affidavit "based
on third-hand hearsay" in terrorism cases comports with the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause. °6
Yaser Hamdi was born in the United States and moved to Saudi
Arabia as a child. 10 7 By 2001 he was living in Afghanistan, where anti-
Taliban forces seized him and turned him over to the U.S. military.
10 8
Classified as an enemy combatant, the military sent Hamdi to brigs in
Virginia and South Carolina after learning that he was a U.S. citizen.09
In June 2002 Hamdi's father filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging his son's designation as an enemy combatant-a status that
the Government claimed allowed the military to detain him indefinitely
without formal charges or proceedings.1
In defending Hamdi's designation as an enemy combatant, the
Government relied exclusively on a two-page declaration from a
Department of Defense Special Advisor."' The Special Advisor had
neither first-hand knowledge of Hamdi's case, nor had he talked to those
who did.'12 Hamdi's affiliation with the Taliban rested on the statements
of an unknown anti-Taliban combatant "who communicated it to
someone in the U.S. military.1 .. The district court found the declaration
insufficient; the Government appealed.
1 4
The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that because Hamdi was captured
in a foreign war zone, he was not entitled to a factual inquiry to challenge
his detention. 5 Moreover, the circuit court found the Government's
105. Id. at 480-82.
106. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2644 (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 2635 (plurality opinion).
108. Id. at 2635-36 (plurality opinion).
109. Id. at 2636 (plurality opinion).
110. Id. (plurality opinion).
111. Id. at 2636-37 (plurality opinion).
112. Id. at 2637 (plurality opinion).
113. Brief for Petitioner at *4 n.4, Hamdi (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 378715. The
declarant asserted that "he [had] been 'substantially involved with matters related to the
detention of enemy combatants,"' and had "review[ed] ... relevant records and reports ...
[pertaining] . . . to the capture of.. . Hamdi and his detention by military forces." Hamdi,
124 S. Ct. at 2637 (fourth omission in original) (citations omitted) (plurality opinion).
114. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2637-38 (plurality opinion).
115. Id. at 2638 (plurality opinion). According to the circuit court, given the
circumstances of Hamdi's detention "the Constitution [did] not entitle him to a searching
2005]
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declaration to be a sufficient factual basis to hold him even though the
declaration was based entirely on third-hand hearsay.'1 6 In short, Hamdi
could not challenge his status so long as the Government produced
"some evidence" to justify his classification."'
A badly divided Supreme Court remanded. "8 Writing for a plurality,
Justice O'Connor weighed Hamdi's due process rights against the
Government's war-making authority."9  She concluded that a citizen
detained as an enemy combatant is entitled to "notice of the factual basis
for his classification and a fair opportunity to [challenge it] before a
neutral decisionmaker."'"2
While ostensibly giving Hamdi his day in court, Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion conceded that "the exigencies of the circumstances may
demand that . . . [the] proceedings be tailored to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of [war].''.
While rejecting the "some evidence" standard the Government
advocated, she would allow an enemy combatant designation to stand
based on a showing of "credible evidence.', 2 2 Further, Justice O'Connor
wrote, "[hlearsay . . . may need to be accepted as the most reliable
available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding."'2 3 She
would require only that "a knowledgeable affiant" summarize reports
already collected "in the ordinary course of military affairs.' ' 24 Finally,
the Government's evidence would enjoy a presumption in its favor, as
long as the accused had the opportunity for rebuttal.
review of the factual determinations underlying his seizure [in Afghanistan]." Id. at 2639
(plurality opinion).
116. Brief for Petitioner at *10-11, Hamdi (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 378715.
117. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639 (plurality opinion).
118. Id. at 2634-35, 2652 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor delivered an opinion
that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer joined. Id. at 2635. Justice
Souter filed an opinion concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment that Justice
Ginsburg joined. Id. at 2657. Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas dissented. Id. at 2660,
2674.
119. Id. at 2647-48 (plurality opinion). The Court initially addressed "whether the
Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as 'enemy combatants.'' Id. at
2639 (plurality opinion). While the Court found the Government did have the authority,
id. at 2640-41 (plurality opinion), discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
120. Id. at 2648 (plurality opinion).
121. Id. at 2649 (plurality opinion).
122. Id. (plurality opinion).
123. Id. (plurality opinion).
124. Id. (plurality opinion).
125. Id. (plurality opinion).
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Four of the justices who took the hardest line in rejecting the Court's
ruling came from the Crawford majority. 6  Writing for himself and
Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia accused the Court of devising "an unheard-
of system in which the citizen rather than the Government bears the
burden of proof, testimony is by hearsay rather than live witnesses, and
the presiding officer may well be a 'neutral' military officer."'2 7 He called
for a straightforward reading of the Constitution's provision requiring
congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus before the
Government may detain an American citizen without charging him."'
Unless Congress suspended the writ, Hamdi must be prosecuted on
criminal charges or released.'29
B. Moussaoui: Of Testimonial Statements, Cross-examination, and the
Unavailability of Witnesses
Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested in August 2001 after raising
suspicions at a flight school in Oklahoma, and subsequently was indicted
on charges relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.130 The
Government alleged he was a member of the al-Qaeda terrorist
organization and charged him with six terrorism related crimes, four of
which carried the death penalty. 3' Complying with its disclosure
126. Compare id. at 2652 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment), id. at 2660 (Scalia, J., dissenting), and id. at 2674 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting), with Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1356 (2004).
127. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 2660-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was careful to limit his opinion to
U.S. citizens "accused of being enemy combatants, who are detained within the territorial
jurisdiction of a federal court." Id. at 2673. (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, "[wJhere [a]
citizen is captured outside and held outside United States, the constitutional requirements
may be different." Id. at 2673 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied 73
U.S.L.W. 3556 (2005).
131. Id. at 457-58. The indictment charged "Moussaoui with six offenses: conspiracy to
commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries; conspiracy to commit aircraft
piracy; conspiracy to destroy aircraft; conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction;
conspiracy to murder United States employees[;] and conspiracy to destroy property." Id.
(citations omitted). The first four carry the death penalty. Id. The prosecution, however,
did not identify Moussaoui as the so-called twentieth hijacker. See Toni Locy, Moussaoui
Case Prosecutors Have Fifth-Plane Theory, USA TODAY, Apr. 24, 2003, at 5A, LEXIS,
News Library, Usatdy File. As this Comment was going to print, Moussaoui pleaded
guilty to all charges against him. Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Pleads Guilty in Terror Plot,
WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al. A month earlier, the Supreme Court denied
Moussaoui's petition for an interlocutory review of the Fourth Circuit's refusal to order
his direct access to key al Qaeda witnesses. David Strout, High Court Won't Hear
Moussaoui's Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/03/21/politics/21cnd-moussaoui.html?cx=l1 14488000&en=a598a3c0ac779ac4&ei
=5070. Moussaoui's guilty plea foreclosed subsequent Supreme Court review following a
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obligations,32 the prosecution provided Moussaoui's defense team with
classified summaries of statements from alleged al-Qaeda leaders held as
enemy combatants at undisclosed locations overseas. 13  As the Fourth
Circuit noted, the detainees were assumed to be in military custody.
3 4
Moussaoui alleged that the statements showed the witnesses would
provide exculpatory information if allowed to testify.3 3 The Government
objected to granting him access to the witnesses, citing a host of national
security concerns including preventing further attacks and avoiding
bolstering other terrorist operatives. 136  For nearly two years,
Moussaoui's right to pretrial access was litigated in both the district court
and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.3 7 Both courts looked to
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 38 as the most
trial, leaving open in other circuits the issue of the scope of Sixth Amendment
confrontation rights under analogous circumstances. Moreover, Moussaoui must still face
a penalty phase hearing. Whether confrontation is required during this phase is uncertain.
See Blakley v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2561 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also
Joshua Herman, Comment, Death Denies Due Process: Evaluating Due Process
Challenges to the Federal Death Penalty Act, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1777, 1858 n.615, 1870
(2004).
132. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding that "the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution").
133. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458-59.
134. Id. at 465. The Government authorized the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (The 9/11 Commission) to release the names of ten
detainees "whose custody has been confirmed officially by the U.S. government." NAT'L
COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 146
(2004), available at http://www.9-Ilcommission.gov/report/9llReport.pdf. They are
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, Riduan Isamuddin (also known as
Hambali), Abd al Rahim al Nashiri, Tawfiq bin Attash (also known as Khallad),
Ramzi Binalshibh, Mohamed al Kahtani, Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir at Ani,
Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi (also known as Abu Bakr al Azdi), and
Hassan Ghul.
Id. at 488 n.2. The Government maintains that the identities of the specific detainees
Moussaoui sought to question remain classified. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 456 n.1.
135. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458; see also Brief of the Appellee at 48-63, Moussaoui
(No. 03-4792), available at 2003 WL 22767608.
136. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 470 (asserting that granting the request would impede
ongoing questioning that could prevent further attacks and harm U.S. foreign relations);
see also Brief for the United States at 43-45, Moussaoui, (No. 03 4792), available at 2003
WL 22519704. The prosecution argued that al Qaeda trained its operatives to exploit the
U.S. legal system, for example, by making fabricated claims of torture. Id. at 44.
Prosecutors argued that granting Moussaoui access to the detainees would show other
terrorists how to impede their own trials if captured by forcing the Government to choose
between "effective intelligence gathering and effective prosecution." Id.
137. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458-61.
138. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000). The Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA) governs the handling of classified material in judicial proceedings. Pub. L. No. 96-
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456, 94 Stat. 2025, 2025 (1980). Enacted in 1980, Congress designed CIPA to protect the
Government from "graymail," where a defendant might threaten to raise classified
information during his trial, creating a "disclose or dismiss dilemma" for the Government.
See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 338 (4th Cir. 2004). It does not provide
additional discovery rights, but instead is a procedural device within the general discovery
rules to limit the manner with which classified information is disclosed "based on the
sensitive nature of the classified information." Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the
Prosecutor's Duty To Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 1471, 1477 n. 25 (2003) (quoting United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). CIPA, in pertinent section, provides:
At any time after the filing of the indictment or information, any party may
move for a pretrial conference to consider matters relating to classified
information that may arise in connection with the prosecution.... No admission
made by the defendant or by any attorney for the defendant at such a conference
may be used against the defendant unless the admission is in writing and is signed
by the defendant and by the attorney for the defendant.
§ 3. Protective Orders
Upon motion of the United States, the court shall issue an order to protect
against the disclosure of any classified information disclosed by the United States
to any defendant in any criminal case in a district court of the United States.
§ 5. Notice of defendant's intention to disclose classified information
(a) . . . [A] defendant [who] reasonably expects to disclose or to cause the
disclosure of classified information in any manner in connection with any trial or
pretrial proceeding involving the criminal prosecution of such defendant.., shall
... notify the attorney for the United States and the court in writing. Such notice
shall include a brief description of the classified information.... No defendant
shall disclose any information known or believed to be classified in connection
with a trial or pretrial proceeding until ... the United States has been afforded a
reasonable opportunity to seek a determination [concerning the use, relevance,
or admissibility of classified information that would otherwise be made during
the trial or pretrial proceeding].
§ 6. Procedures for cases involving classified information
(a) . . . [T]he United States may request the court to conduct a hearing to
make all determinations concerning the use, relevance, or admissibility of
classified information that would otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial
proceeding. Upon such a request, the court shall conduct such a hearing. Any
hearing held pursuant to this subsection . . . shall be held in camera if the
Attorney General certifies to the court in such petition that a public proceeding
may result in the disclosure of classified information .... [T]he court shall rule
prior to the commencement of the relevant proceeding.
(c)... (1) Upon any determination by the court authorizing the disclosure of
specific classified information under the procedures established by this section,
the United States may move that, in lieu of the disclosure of such specific
classified information, the court order-
(A) the substitution for such classified information of a statement
admitting relevant facts that the specific classified information would tend to
prove; or
(B) the substitution for such classified information of a summary of the
specific classified information.
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The court shall grant such a motion of the United States if it finds that the
statement or summary will provide the defendant with substantially the same
ability to make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified
information....
(2) The United States may . . . submit to the court an affidavit of the
Attorney General certifying that disclosure of classified information would cause
identifiable damage to the national security of the United States and explaining
the basis for the classification of such information. If so requested by the United
States, the court shall examine such affidavit in camera and ex parte.
(e) ... (1) Whenever the court denies a motion by the United States that it
issue an order . . . and the United States files with the court an affidavit of the
Attorney General objecting to disclosure of the classified information at issue,
the court shall order that the defendant not disclose or cause the disclosure of
such information.
(2) Whenever a defendant is prevented by an order ... from disclosing or
causing the disclosure of classified information, the court shall dismiss the
indictment or information; except that, when the court determines that the
interests of justice would not be served by dismissal of the indictment or
information, the court shall order such other action, in lieu of dismissing the
indictment or information, as the court determines is appropriate. Such action
may include, but need not be limited to-
(A) dismissing specified counts of the indictment or information;
(B) finding against the United States on any issue as to which the
excluded classified information relates; or
(C) striking or precluding all or part of the testimony of a witness.
(f)" ... Whenever the court determines.., that classified information may be
disclosed in connection with a trial or pretrial proceeding, the court shall, unless
the interests of fairness do not so require, order the United States to provide the
defendant with the information it expects to use to rebut the classified
information. The court may place the United States under a continuing duty to
disclose such rebuttal information ...
§ 7. Interlocutory appeal
(a) An interlocutory appeal by the United States taken before or after the
defendant has been placed in jeopardy shall lie to a court of appeals from a
decision or order of a district court in a criminal case authorizing the disclosure
of classified information, imposing sanctions for nondisclosure of classified
information, or refusing a protective order sought by the United States to
prevent the disclosure of classified information.
§ 8. Introduction of classified information
(c) ... During the examination of a witness in any criminal proceeding, the
United States may object to any question or line of inquiry that may require the
witness to disclose classified information not previously found to be admissible.
Following such an objection, the court shall take such suitable action to
determine whether the response is admissible as will safeguard against the
compromise of any classified information. Such action may include requiring the
United States to provide the court with a proffer of the witness' response to the
question or line of inquiry and requiring the defendant to provide the court with
a proffer of the nature of the information he seeks to elicit.
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analogous statutory framework for reconciling the conflict between
Moussaoui's Sixth Amendment fair trial rights and the Government's
legitimate efforts to protect national security interests.' 39 Under CIPA,
the Government may furnish substitutions that "provide the defendant
with substantially the same ability to make his defense as would
disclosure of the ... classified information.',
40
Both courts also agreed that the Government's concerns precluded
hauling the witnesses into court,41 but they clashed over the appropriate
remedy. 4  The district court found the substitutions the Government
143
proposed to be unreliable, incomplete, and inaccurate. Instead, the
judge ordered that the parties depose the witnesses under Rule 15 of the
144
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Acknowledging some of the
18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 2, 3,5(a), 6(a), (c), (e), (f), 7(a), 8(c) (2000).
139. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 471 n.20 (finding that although "CIPA does not apply [to
defendant access to detainee-witnesses] . . . [it] provides a useful framework for
considering the questions raised").
140. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6 (2000).
141. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458, 476.
142. Id. at 477-78. Compare United States v. Moussaoui, No. CRIM. 01-455-A, 2003
WL 21277161, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2003) (explaining that the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the district court's order requiring the Government to produce detainee-
witness for video-taped depositions), with Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 479-80 (requiring the
district court to work with the prosecution and defense to fashion the substitute
statements the district court ordered to be offered in lieu of video-taped depositions).
143. Moussaoui, 2003 WL 21277161, at *2-3; see Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 477-79.
144. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 456. Rule 15 provides:
(1) In General. A party may move that a prospective witness be deposed in
order to preserve testimony for trial. The court may grant the motion because of
exceptional circumstances and in the interest of justice....
(2) Detained Material Witness. A witness who is detained ... may request to
be deposed by filing a written motion and giving notice to the parties. The court
may then order that the deposition be taken and may discharge the witness after
the witness has signed under oath the deposition transcript.
(b) Notice.
(1) In General. A party seeking to take a deposition must give every other
party reasonable written notice of the deposition's date and location. The notice
must state the name and address of each deponent. If requested by a party
receiving the notice, the court may, for good cause, change the deposition's date
or location.
(2) To the Custodial Officer. A party seeking to take the deposition must
also notify the officer who has custody of the defendant of the scheduled date
and location.
(c) Defendant's Presence.
(1) Defendant in Custody. The officer who has custody of the defendant
must produce the defendant at the deposition and keep the defendant in the
witness's presence during the examination, unless the defendant:
(A) waives in writing the right to be present; or
(B) persists in disruptive conduct justifying exclusion after being warned
by the court that disruptive conduct will result in the defendant's exclusion.
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Government's concerns, she invoked Rule 15(b)(1) to authorize using a
remote video hook up with a time delay to take the depositions.
145
The Fourth Circuit, conversely, found the Government-prepared
summaries of the inculpatory statements sufficient to protect
Moussaoui's constitutional rights. 146 The court also said that Moussaoui
should have the same, limited opportunity to have his questions posed to
the witnesses as the Government had.47 In practical terms, this meant
that Moussaoui would not know if or how his submitted questions were
asked, nor would he be able to ask follow up questions.' 48 His answers
would come from summaries of reports that the Government prepared
for the intelligence community at large.
49
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the substitutions would not
completely leave Moussaoui in the position he would be in if the
witnesses testified.50 Still, the circuit court said that the substitutions
provided "sufficient indicia of reliability" for admission.' Specifically,
said the court, those who originally produced the summaries "have a
profound interest in obtaining accurate information from the witnesses
and in reporting that information accurately to those who can use it to
(e) Manner of Taking. Unless these rules or a court order provides otherwise, a
deposition must be taken and filed in the same manner as a deposition in a civil
action, except that:
(2) The scope and manner of the deposition examination and cross-
examination must be the same as would be allowed during trial.
(3) The government must provide to the defendant ... any statement of the
deponent in the government's possession to which the defendant would be
entitled at trial.
(f) Use as Evidence. A party may use all or part of a deposition as provided by
the Federal Rules of Evidence.
FED. R. CRIM P. 15(a)-(b), (c)(1), (e)-(f).
145. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458; see Jerry Seper, Appeals Court Rejects U.S. Effort To
Block Moussaoui, WASH. TIMEs, June 27, 2003, at A3; see also Associated Press, Feds:
Moussaoui Judge Out of Bounds, CBSNEWS.COM, Apr. 24, 2003, at http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2002/O7/22/attack/main5l5896.shtml. The time delay would allow the court to
prevent transmissions of impermissible questions. Id.
146. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 482. While the Fourth Circuit was deliberating, the
Government sent a letter to the judges clarifying that members of the prosecution team
had provided information or suggested lines of inquiry to be used with the detainees. Id.
at 460. While it appears that the court was not aware of this, nothing in the court's opinion
suggests that this was more than a misunderstanding. See id. at 479. However, the court
found that the defendant was entitled to the same opportunity. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 478 & n.29.
149. Id. at 458 n.5, 461-62.
150. Id. at 477.
151. Id. at 478.
1098
Implications for the War on Terrorism




Accordingly, the court ruled that the jury should be informed, inter alia,
that the Government provided substitute testimony derived from
statements the witnesses made "under conditions that provide
circumstantial guarantees of reliability.'
5 3
A final issue the court addressed dealt head-on with Moussaoui's
confrontation rights.5 4 Under the rule of completeness, the Government
asserted that the court must allow it to supplement the statements
Moussaoui sought to admit with other, contextual information.'
Otherwise, the statements would be incomplete and potentially
misleading to the jury as to Moussaoui's culpability. 56 The danger was
that the supplements would include inculpatory statements from
witnesses the defense had not questioned. 157 To remedy this dilemma,
the Fourth Circuit ordered the district court to oversee drafting the
submissions, and only Moussaoui could admit them. 58 The Government
could not use the witnesses' statements to advance its own case.59
I1. APPLYING CRAWFORD'S COMMANDS TO TERRORISM CASES
Crawford was a "run-of-the-mill assault prosecution,"'60 and one
should proceed with caution in extrapolating from a simple criminal case
rules of law that may apply to the complexities of a global war on
terrorism. Yet, Justice Scalia warned that "replacing categorical
constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests . . . and
[v]ague standards" in simple cases such as Crawford would create grave
danger in "politically charged cases . . . where the impartiality of even
those at the highest levels of the judiciary might not be so clear.''6
A. Hamdi: A Categorical Rule Sacrificed for the "Exigencies of War"
In Hamdi, Justice O'Connor's opinion dimmed the bright-line
established in Crawford, allowing testimonial hearsay to be admitted
152. [d.
153. Id. at 480.
154. Id. at 481-82.
155. Id. at 481. FED. R. EVID. 106 codifies the common law rule of completeness,
providing that "[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a
party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any
other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered
contemporaneously with it."
156. Id. at 482.
157. Id. at 481-82.
158. Id. at 482.
159. See id.
160. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354,1374 (2004).
161. Id. at 1373-74.
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without prior cross-examination, at least under analogous facts."' The
Department of Defense declaration exemplifies the type of ex parte
statements Justice Scalia identified as the "principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed.', 6 3 Not only was the declarant not
present for cross-examination, but even if he had been, he could scarcely
attest to the reliability of the statements in his conclusory declaration'
l64
In defining a "fair opportunity" to rebut the Government's charges,
Justice O'Connor adopted a balancing test that once again relegated
confrontation to a mere "preference"-one option among several for
assuring the reliability of hearsay testimony. 65  In fact, allowing the
Government to rely on hearsay based on military reports from
162. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25. The right to confront witnesses, like
the right to counsel, may not technically attach to an unindicted enemy combatant. See
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970) (noting that "it is this literal right to
'confront' the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the
Confrontation Clause"). Legal commentators have noted the resulting irony that
noncitizen terrorist suspects who are tried in civilian courts may receive greater
constitutional protections than citizens who are detained but not criminally charged. E.g.,
Jesselyn A. Radack, You Say Defendant, I Say Combatant: Opportunistic Treatment of
Terrorism Suspects Ileld in the United States and the Need for Due Process, 29 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 525, 539-40 (2005). Given the typically clandestine nature of
their capture and the indefinite term of their confinement, citizen enemy combatants need
the full panoply of due process rights, particularly as the results of that hearing may
preclude or postpone further judicial review. Id. at 545-53. The Court in Hamdi affirmed
his right to counsel on remand, as well as his right to factually challenge the Government's
allegations. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2660 (2004). The question remains
whether allowing the kind of hearsay presented in Hamdi to have the presumption in its
favor, as the plurality would allow, without confrontation provides the citizen enemy
combatant a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See infra text accompanying notes 168-
72.
163. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1363-65. Indeed, Justice Scalia consistently identifies
statements the Government obtained in secret and then presented at trial without making
the witness available for cross-examination as the archetypal Confrontation Clause
violation. Id.; see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 143 (1999) (Scalia, J. concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
164. See Brief for Petitioner at *4-7, Hamdi (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 378715. As
discussed, the Government's declarant based his two-page statement on routine records
and reports sent in from the field. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the military did not even contend that the Special Advisor talked to anyone
about the reports. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2637 (plurality opinion).
165. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor explicitly
accepted the sufficiency of the Government's affidavit. Id. (plurality opinion). Hamdi
need only be offered some sort of opportunity to challenge the Government's allegations,
but not necessarily one that would allow him to cross-examine the declarants. Id.
(plurality opinion) (indicating that a "knowledgeable" affiant may base his declaration on
"documentation regarding battlefield detainees already... kept in the ordinary course of
military affairs"). As the Government's declaration in Hamdi illustrates, such an affiant is
unlikely to have first-hand knowledge regarding the veracity of the information. Brief for
Petitioner at *4-7, Hamdi (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 378715.
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unidentified sources prepared for purposes other than litigation would
allow admission of evidence excluded from even the broadest hearsay• 166
exceptions. Moreover, Justice O'Connor would place the onus on the
accused to negate the impact in court of statements by military officers
during war time."'
Yet it was precisely the drafter's goal in adding the Sixth Amendment
to burden the Government by requiring confrontation and cross-
examination."' Third or fourth hand information obtained piecemeal
from unknown witnesses cobbled together into a narrative declaration
fails to meet even the looser Roberts test. 69 It ignores completely the
demands of Crawford. 7 The Court granted Hamdi an opportunity to be
heard, but he still must challenge statements of witnesses who will never
enter the courtroom nor sit across from him in a deposition. 17 The
"exigencies of war" may call for relaxing hearsay standards, but in
Hamdi, they were eliminated.
B. Moussaoui Directly Challenges Crawford's Holding
The Moussaoui holding presents complex issues involving nearly all of
Crawford's unanswered questions.' As a threshold matter, a detainee's
statements obtained through interrogation would appear to fit any of the
166. See FED. R. EVID. 805 (allowing hearsay within hearsay if each part of the
combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rules). The
Government's declaration arguably could fall under the exception for records of regularly
conducted activity or public records and reports. Id. R. 803(6), (8). However, both rules
would disallow the exception if the sources of information or other circumstances indicate
lack of trustworthiness. Id. The military reports the Government relies upon are
characteristics of the traditional "'mosaic-like nature of intelligence gathering,"' in which
snippets of information from an array of sources with varying reliability are collected
overseas, transmitted to Washington, and then pieced together. McGehee v. Casey, 718
F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971
(D.C. Cir. 1982)). In light of the declarant's description of the source of the information,
including an unknown anti-Taliban combatant, the sources of information or other
circumstances clearly indicate lack of trustworthiness. See supra text accompanying notes
111-14.
167. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649 (plurality opinion) (stating that "once the
Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-
combatant criteria the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more
persuasive evidence that he falls outside the criteria").
168. See Berger, supra note 4, at 578-86; see also supra text accompanying note 81.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 44-62.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
171. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2649 (plurality opinion).
172. See id. at 2649-50. By finding the Government's declaration satisfied its
evidentiary burden, the Court implicitly waives Hamdi's right to confront even the
Government's declarant. Id. (plurality opinion).
173. See supra Part I.B.
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three "formulations of testimonial statements" Justice Scalia identified.
17 4
While usually not given under oath, detainee questioning is "custodial
examination" because the detainee is not free to leave, and is held under
harsh conditions of confinement.75  Moreover, inculpatory detainee
statements regarding the accused are likely to come from confessional
statements.76
Federal law enforcement involvement in questioning detainees colors
the statement as testimonial under even a narrow reading because they
are in effect police statements bearing "a striking resemblance" to the ex
parte statements the Framers feared. 77 The Court has been particularly
wary of custodial confessions, speaking "with one voice in declaring
presumptively unreliable accomplices' confessions that incriminate
defendants.',
78
If detainee statements are testimonial, then Crawford requires
confrontation between the witness and the defendant at some point in
the proceedings. 9  The district court's deposition order would have
included such an encounter, at least with Moussaoui's defense counsel.'80
Yet, one of the primary reasons the Government refused to comply with
the district court's initial order was to prevent direct interaction between
174. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
175. See, e.g., Don Van Natta Jr., Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal
World, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at Al (describing conditions of confinement and
interrogation techniques for alleged al-Qaeda detainees); Carol Rosenberg, 'We have No
Intention of Making it Comfortable,' HERALD.COM, Jan. 10, 2002, http://www.miami.com/
mld/miamiherald/news/world/cuba/2437025.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp
(describing conditions at the detainee facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba).
176. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note
134, at 146. If a detainee is able to provide sufficiently relevant and material information
about a terrorist defendant to aid the prosecution, the detainee may very well be
implicated at least as a co-conspirator. This is because terrorists operate in semi-
autonomous cells. Id. at 145, 180, 241-50. Operations are strictly compartmented, and
information is shared as needed about other participants, the plan and target for the
operation, and the specific dates to attack. Id. at 235-36, 244, 249-50. The ability to
identify another member of an operational cell may also come from being present at
specific meetings or training camps when the accused was there. Id. at 234-35, 275-76.
177. See supra text accompanying note 88.
178. E.g., Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (noting this presumption against
admitting accomplice statements "was premised on the basic understanding that when one
person accuses another of a crime under circumstances in which the declarant stands to
gain by inculpating another, the accusation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected
to the scrutiny of cross examination"); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 134 (1999)
(finding "that accomplices' confessions that inculpate a criminal defendant are not within
a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule ... [under the Court's] Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence").
179. See supra text accompanying notes 84-98.
180. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CRIM. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21277161, at *3 (E.D.
Va. May 15, 2003).
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the accused and the detainee."' The Fourth Circuit agreed with the
Government, as its order allowing substitutions indicated.
"8 2
The circuit court chose to forgo Crawford and instead applied a
Roberts-type test, looking for indicia of reliability as foundational
support for admission of substitute testimony.83 The court placed
confidence in the reliability of the detainees' statements because those
questioning them sought information to prevent attacks, not specifically
to further prosecution.1m This confidence may be misplaced because the
conditions of confinement may lead a detainee to provide information to
please his captors."5 The Supreme Court itself has registered skepticism
regarding such statements, noting that a statement made under duress
"may provide no basis for supposing that the declarant is particularly
likely to be telling the truth - indeed, the circumstances may even be
such that the declarant is particularly unlikely to be telling the truth.'
' 86
IV. RECONCILING CRAWFORD AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
Crawford established a bright-line test for the admission of hearsay
evidence. '8 To be admitted, the statements must be from a witness who
181. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 470-71 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (2005).
182. Id. See generally Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due
Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1605 (2004),
WL 32 HOFLR 1605 (noting that post-September 11 trial courts are more responsive to
claims that certain actions of the political branches have endangered fundamental
constitutional rights, while appellate courts have been more willing to adopt a deferential
attitude).
183. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 478. The court did acknowledge the Crawford holding
when it prohibited the Government from offering witnesses' statements in support of its
case against Moussaoui. Id. at 481. Perhaps the court found Crawford inapplicable
because the primary focus was on Moussaoui's efforts to obtain exculpatory information
available to the prosecution, or because of the national security concerns implicated in the
defendant's efforts to gain access to the detainee witnesses.
184. Id. at 478.
185. See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Forget the 'Poisons and Deadly
Gases,' NEWSWEEK, July 5, 2004, at 6, 6. Isikoff reported that a captured al-Qaeda
commander, the principal source for allegations that Usama Bin Laden collaborated with
Saddam Hussein, recanted his story. Id. The article cites U.S. officials who said they
suspect that the commander told his interrogators what they wanted to hear in the face of
aggressive interrogation techniques. Id.
186. Chase, supra note 27, 1049-50 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822-23
(1990)). An additional concern is that a detainee may provide exculpatory information
regarding the accused, but it will not be reported because the information does not
provide intelligence to prevent further attacks. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 462 n.14. Yet as
government agents, interrogators are considered part of the prosecutorial team; the
defendant, therefore, is entitled to the information. The Fourth Circuit dismissed this
possibility as "unlikely" without further explanation. Id.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 83-92.
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is unavailable at trial, and the accused must be afforded a prior
opportunity for cross-examination.'" By limiting judicial discretion, the
Court provided a coherent and intelligible rule that lower courts can
consistently apply.8 9 Yet Crawford appears to provide no avenue to
protect legitimate national security concerns when the Government
seeks to use out-of-court statements to detain an American citizen as an
"enemy combatant" or try a suspected terrorist in a civilian court." °
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the means to
preserve the constitutional right to confrontation, while adjusting on a
case-by-case basis to the exigencies of an unprecedented war on
terrorism.' 9' This Part will explore avenues for doing so, focusing first on
the use of the type of hearsay testimony relied on in Hamdi. Then, the
more thorny issues implicated in Moussaoui will be addressed.
A. The Use of Hearsay Against U.S. Citizens Must Follow the Crawford
Bright-Line Test
Few dispute the authority of the military to detain a suspected enemy• • • 192
on the battlefield, regardless of his or her citizenship. When the
imminent threat has abated and the prisoner is securely incarcerated,
however, constitutional guarantees take primacy. 93
The Court should reconcile the apparent conflict between the
standards for the admission of hearsay evidence articulated in Crawford
and those adopted in Hamdi194 At a minimum, the Government's case
should not rest on third or fourth hand hearsay, whose reliability is
impossible to gauge.'9 To allow a government official, without first hand
knowledge, to attest to unspecified allegations leads to the kind of
inconsistency illustrated in Crawford itself. 96 Worse, it invites abuses in
188. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 83-97.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 83-97.
191. See infra text accompanying note 223.
192. See Brief for Petitioner at *10, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 123 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-
6696), 2004 WL 378715 (noting that Hamdi does not challenge his initial seizure or
transfer to U.S. custody).
193. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648 (plurality opinion) (noting that it is during times of
crisis that the Nation "must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which
we fight abroad").
194. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1370 (2004) (noting that it runs
counter to the history of the Confrontation Clause to adopt the position that "the Framers
meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence,
much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability').
195. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88. The Government's deposition in
Hamdi and witness statements taken in secrecy typify the egregious abuses the
Confrontation Clause was designed to cure.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
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the name of national security, such as those that have occurred at other
times when our national security appeared threatened.1 97 Once the
Government designates a prisoner an "enemy combatant," detention
may last until the end of hostilities. 98 Given the prognosis for the threat
of anti-American terrorism, this may be indefinitely.' 99
B. Preserving Confrontation Through Compromise
More complicated cases, such as Moussaoui, involve statements from
witnesses whom the Government has made unavailable, citing national
security concerns.2 0° In Moussaoui, the prosecution voluntarily chose to
forgo using detainee statements. 0 ' The defendant's exercise of his
compulsory process right to subpoena witnesses who made exculpatory
statements implicated Confrontation Clause issues because, inter alia,
prosecutors wanted to supplement any statements Moussaoui chose to
use.2 0 It is foreseeable that a future case may implicate out-of-court
detainee statements as part of a critical chain in the prosecution's case-in-
chief.203  The question then becomes whether Justice Scalia's clear
197. See infra text accompanying notes 232-37; see also Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (approving measures during World War II directed at persons
of Japanese ancestry). While Korematsu often is cited for this proposition, it is
particularly fitting given the widely drawn analogy between the attack on Pearl Harbor
and those on September 11, 2001 in New York and Washington, D.C. E.g., James J.
Wirtz, Ddjd Vu? Comparing Pearl Harbor and September 11, 24 HARV. INT'L REV. 73
(2002); Toni Stroud, Silence Speaks at Pearl: 60 Years Later, USS Arizona Grave Still
Haunts Visitors, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 2001, at C8, LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File.
198. Jaykant M. Patidar, Note, Citizenship and the Treatment of American Citizen
Terrorists in the United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 805, 817 (2004), WL 42BRNDLJ 805
(explaining that enemy combatants "are denied their constitutional protections, which
include the basic right of talking to an attorney or being tried, until the end of hostilities").
199. id.
200. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 475 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73
U.S.L.W. 3556 (2005).
201. Brief for the United States at 70 n.24, Moussaoui (No. 03-4792) (stating that the
prosecution does not seek to offer detainee witness statements- or summaries thereof-in
its case-in-chief).
202. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 482.
203. Brief for the United States at 2-3, Moussaoui (No. 03-4792). In its brief, the
Government argued:
Beyond any effect on this case, the district court's analysis threatens the
Government's ability to prosecute any terrorists for the crimes of September 11
or other terrorists for any future attacks. . . . In subsequent cases, where
defendants do not voluntarily incriminate themselves, the logic of the district
court's opinion [requiring production of the detainees for video depositions]
would foreclose prosecution entirely. The Government's successes in the war on
terrorism have given it access for intelligence gathering purposes to enemy
combatants with substantial knowledge of al Qaeda's operations. Under the
district court's decision, any defendant charged with criminal responsibility for
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position that the Constitution demands confrontation still holds sway
over Justice O'Connor's balancing approach-the Roberts test for indicia
of reliability.
When the Government seeks to use out-of-court statements to convict
a terrorist suspect, the demands of the Confrontation Clause require
more than unchallenged assertions by a detainee who has not faced
adversarial questioning. 2"' This would be consistent with the rationale in
Crawford.2 0 5 Conversely, the weaknesses of Roberts are no clearer than
in terrorism cases involving detainee testimony taken in secret.2 6 The
other factors of reliability noted in Roberts-oath, adversarial testing,
and the demeanor of the witness-are absent. 07
The Confrontation Clause needs to be read within the context of other
procedural protections in the Bill of Rights. °8 Taken together, they
substantiate the Framers' focus on protecting the accused's rights against
the overwhelming power of the state. 2°' History and experience taughtthe Framers that the state may rely on criminal prosecution to eliminate
terrorist operations related to al Qaeda will be able to make a plausible claim to
have access to these combatants. The district court's analysis puts the
Government to the choice of either gathering intelligence to maximize the
prospects for avoiding future terrorist attacks or prosecuting terrorists.
However, nothing in the Constitution puts the Government on the horns of this
dilemma.
Id.
204. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 481-82. In deference to Moussaoui's Confrontation
Clause rights, the circuit court made clear that the "rule of completeness is not to be used
by the Government as a means of seeking the admission of inculpatory statements that
neither explain nor clarify the statements designated by Moussaoui." Id. at 482. To
ensure Moussaoui's constitutional rights were protected, the court further ruled that only
the defendant could introduce detainee statements to comport with his compulsory
process rights. Id.
205. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1369 (2004) (finding that the case law
has "remained faithful to the Framers' understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses
absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine").
206. Id. (noting that the Roberts test "fails to protect against paradigmatic
confrontation violations" by applying the same analysis "whether or not the hearsay
consists of ex parte testimony ... [and by] admit[ing] statements that do consist of ex parte
testimony upon a mere finding of reliability").
207. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 481 n.38 (noting the absence of demeanor evidence
for the jury to weigh when considering the truthfulness of the detainees' statements). The
Government's desire to prevent the detainee from knowing he is providing evidence for
trial precludes requiring the detainee to take an oath, while the point of the substitutions
is, inter alia, to prevent detainee contact with the defendant. Id. at 470-71, 482.
208. See Friedman, supra note 8, at 468 (noting the consistency with which the
confrontation right was tied to other criminal procedure protections in even early drafts of
the Sixth Amendment).
209. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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political enemies.2 ' ° The Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause,
the Seventh Amendment right to counsel at critical stages of the
prosecution, public trials, and right to a jury evolved from this
211 212tradition. ' These protections interfere with the truth-seeking function.
Nonetheless, the Crawford Court singled out custodial confessions and
other evidence the Government produced in secret as particularly
dangerous tools in the state's arsenal.2 3
Ex parte detainee statements lack even the Roberts indices of
reliability because there is no cross-examination, no demeanor evidence
214for the jury to weigh, and no oath. The setting is undoubtedly
adversarial, but it is not so for the purposes of advocating the defendant's215
case. Even if the defendant is allowed to pose questions to the
detainees, the questions are presented out of context and unstructured to
avoid letting the detainee know the purpose of the qu .216avod lt ig e t e w e ro of questions. This
simply cannot be called "cross-examination" in any true sense of the
term."7
210. See Berger, supra note 4, at 568-71 (tracing the English Crown's use of ex parte
statements against political opponents); id. at 580-86 (explaining the Framers' experience
with similar practices in the American Colonies).
211. Id. at 562-63, 588.
212. E.g., id. at 586 (noting that in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206-07
(1964), the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel was implicated when government
agents interrogated an indicted defendant despite potential interference with truth-
seeking); see also id. at 208 (White, J., dissenting).
213. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1367 & n.7 (2004) (noting that the
Government's involvement in producing testimony with potential prosecution in mind
"presents unique potential for prosecutorial abuse-a fact borne out time and again
throughout a history with which the Framers were keenly familiar").
214. See supra text accompanying notes 111-13, 146-49; see also United States v.
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 481 n.38 (4th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging but excusing the
absence of demeanor evidence when substitute statements are allowed in lieu of direct
testimony), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (2005).
215. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 470 (noting that the Government sought to maintain
ongoing questioning of the detainees to prevent future attacks); see also Brief for the
United States at 41-43, Moussaoui (no. 03-4792).
216. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 460 (indicating that questions submitted for use with
detainees arc treated as discretionary); see also id. at 478 (noting that the substitutions are
drawn from "summaries of statements made over the course of several months"). During
litigation of Moussaoui's compulsory process rights, members of the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States were allowed to submit questions for use in
interrogations. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., supra note 134,
at 146. They, too, had no control over the manner in which the questions were asked. Id.
They were told that questioning the detainees on their behalf "might disrupt the sensitive
interrogation process." Id.
217. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "cross-examination" as
"[t]he questioning of a witness at a trial or hearing by the party opposed to the party who
called the witness to testify"); see Berger, supra note 4, at 566-67 (describing analogous
deficiencies in meeting the confrontation requirements). As Professor Berger suggests, in
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The Fourth Circuit's reliance on CIPA to authorize substitutions
218places a gloss of congressional authorization on its ruling. CIPA
requires courts to balance national security concerns against the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.219  The balancing is weighted
toward the defendant, requiring that the defendant be left with
"substantially the same ability to make his defense as would disclosure of
the specific classified information. '" 20  Nonetheless, the procedures
protect classified intelligence through substitutions. 22 1 In this sense,
CIPA does provide guidance for cases such as Moussaoui's by allowing
means other than public disclosure for the defendant to use classified
information.222
If the Government chooses to prosecute, Rule 15 provides an avenue
for respecting a defendant's confrontation rights while accommodating
223security concerns. This was the district court's initial response to
those contexts, the jury "need[s] to know about the government's role in creating this
evidence" to weigh the evidence properly and be informed about the bias inherent in the
interrogation process, including the possible use of physical and psychological pressure
and implied or explicit threats. Id. at 566.
218. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476 (referencing Congress's intent in enacting CIPA to
ensure that the executive branch's efforts to protect classified information did not
overcome an accused's right to a fair trial).
219. See Saul M. Pilchen & Benjamin B. Klubes, Using the Classified Information
Procedures Act in Criminal Cases: A Primer for Defense Counsel, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV
191, 211 (1994). Litigation over disputes rising under CIPA enforcement is common,
lengthy, and tedious. See id. at 211-14. Proceedings and submissions under both sections
are held in camera, and defense counsel frequently is required to have a security clearance
to review classified material that cannot be completely wiped clean of sensitive
information without altering its relevancy or exculpatory value. Id. at 193, 197 n.21.
220. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1) (2000).
221. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 477.
222. Id. at 476-78.
223. See Nancy Gertner, Video Conferencing: Learning Through Screens, 12 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 769, 774 (2004) (explaining that Rule 15 depositions meet
Confrontation Clause requirements under "exceptional circumstances"). In order to use
videotaped depositions, admission of former testimony and governing unavailability of the
witness also must be met. FED. R. EviD. 804(a), (b)(1). Arguably, application of
Crawford in these circumstances enhances the appeal of military tribunals, particularly in
the aftermath of another attack in the United States. See The Moussaoui Experiment,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2003, at A18 (advocating transferring Moussaoui's case to a military
commission because it may create "bad law" given the pressure on prosecutors to cut
doctrinal corners and the heinous nature of the crimes alleged). While military tribunals
do not enforce the Sixth Amendment safeguards in the same manner as in civilian courts,
the Confrontation Clause's antecedents in both English and American common law, as
well as the values of fundamental fairness that led to its adoption, compel its adoption
regardless of the tribunal. See Dratel, supra note 17, at 20-21. More importantly, no
prosecution, regardless of the forum, can rely on the testimony of a witness held in secret
and questioned under unknown circumstances without trampling on the core values the
Framers preserved. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364-65 (2004).
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S• 224 vrmnMoussaoui's request for access to the detainees, but the Government
cited serious and specific justification for refusing to comply. 2 ' The
Government's concerns should be respected because they go to the heart
of the President's ability to wage an effective, long-term war against
terrorism.226
Defense counsel also must be allowed to obtain specific answers to
questions posed.227  If direct examination would disrupt critical
questioning of the detainee, the Government must instead submit
defense questions as written and provide unaltered transcripts of the
28
witness's responses.28 If the prosecution objects to specific questions for
articulated cause, they and defense counsel should craft alternative
language.229 Follow up questions also should be allowed, particularly
when multiple groups already are submitting questions that are likely to
224. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 456; see also supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
225. See supra text accompanying note 136.
226. See Brief for the United States at 41-42, Moussaoui, (No. 03-4792). During
litigation the parties did not dispute the Government's assertion that
[tihe Nation is currently engaged in an armed conflict with an enemy force that
has already killed more than 3,000 individuals in attacks carried out within the
continental United States and hundreds more in attacks on U.S. embassies,
warships, and other interests abroad. The interest at stake in this case involves
paramount concerns of protecting national security by preserving the
Government's ability to gather intelligence vital to saving American lives and
winning this ongoing war.
Id. Moreover, foreign leaders often risk domestic instability by publicly supporting U.S.
counterterrorist polices. See, e.g., Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World: Hearing
Before the Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. (2003) (statement of Steven
Emerson, Executive Director, Investigative Project, Author, American Jihad: The
Terrorists Living Among Us), http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/hearings/hearing3/
witnessemerson.htm (July 9, 2003). Emerson cited a 2002 survey by the Pew Research
Center for the People and the Press concerning global attitudes, The survey asked
respondents in a number of countries whether they favored or opposed the U.S.-led
efforts to fight terrorism. Id. Emerson provided the following survey results: "[M]ore
than 50% of those in Indonesia, Turkey (99.8% Muslim), and Senegal (94% Muslim)
'oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism' [; and] 79% of those in Egypt (94% Muslim)
and 85% of those in Jordan 'oppose the US-led efforts to fight terrorism."' Id. (citation
omitted). The number of those opposed to U.S. counterterrorist policies is likely to have
increased further following the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
227. Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua L. Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government's
Secrecy and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, 48
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 69, 69 (2004). Defense counsel in most national security cases have
limited clearances that allow them to review a sizeable amount of classified information.
Id. at 70.
228. Id. at 69-70.
229. See, e.g., Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 480 (ordering an "interactive" process involving
the defense, prosecution, and the court in drafting substitutions to be used in lieu of
testimony).
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expand on previous answers. 3 The Government should be granted
some flexibility in deciding when to ask the questions, within a set time
frame.3 '
Cases such as Moussaoui, where detainee statements may be both
inculpatory and exculpatory, are more complex. 232  The Fourth Circuit
struck an appropriate balance in finding that the prosecution may seek
inclusion of information that will make the witnesses' statements
complete, without allowing the Government to use the detainees'
233statements to further its case.
The Constitution is neither a "suicide pact2 34 nor is it dispensable,
even in times of crisis. 23 Accommodations to competing demands have
been struck since the beginning of the Republic, so long as the ultimate
purpose of safeguarding individual liberty was preserved.23  The Sixth
Amendment is not immune to this process, and the fair trial rights it
237guarantees are not absolute. They have been abridged before in theinterest of the administration of justice.23 The Confrontation Clause also
230. See supra notes 146, 216 (noting that the prosecution team and the National
Commission on the Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States had submitted questions or
suggested lines of inquiry).
231. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 479 (indicating that the process by which members of
the prosecution team contributed to detainee questioning had worked no unfairness on
Moussaoui).
232. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
233. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 480-82. The circuit court gave the prosecution a strict
admonition against attempting to include inculpatory information under the guise of
completeness. Id. at 481-82. The trial judge will have final say over the wording of the
substitutions, and the prosecution will not be allowed to raise further objections in a
CIPA-like setting. Id. at 482.
234. Haig v. Agec, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981) (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963)).
235. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) ("It would indeed be ironic if, in
the name of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties
... which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.").
236. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (plurality opinion).
According to the Court:
"The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due
process under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our
constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies of crisis, that
there is the greatest temptation to dispense with guarantees which, it is feared,
will inhibit government action."
Id. (citing and quoting Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 164-65).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
238. E.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970) (approving the removal of a
disruptive defendant from the courtroom); United States v. Kneeland, 148 F.3d 6, 12 (1st
Cir. 1998) (finding an implicit waiver of counsel where the defendant repeatedly refuses to
work with court appointed attorneys). In these circumstances, the defendant's own
actions have led to an implicit waiver of constitutional protections. The overriding
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can accommodate important national security concerns, but the accused's
right to confront those who levy charges against him must be upheld.
Crawford is a clear and timely affirmation of Chief Justice Marshall's call
to be watchful against inroads on these principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause rulings have swung during
the last fifty years between two conflicting interpretations. The
dominant reading admitted hearsay from unavailable witnesses as long as
other indices of reliability were present. Crawford represents the
ascendancy of an originalist interpretation that would allow such
statements only if the witness was both unavailable and the accused had
a prior opportunity for confrontation. Yet Crawford left significant
questions unanswered: standards for defining testimonial statements,
sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, and the scope of the
unavailability requirement. These issues are particularly troubling in
terrorism cases, where the Government frequently must rely on hearsay
to make its case. Read within the Court's handling of other Sixth
Amendment cases, Crawford does not permit the type of crime charged
to permit abridging Sixth Amendment protections. The Court, however,
has left open alternative methods to reconcile the defendant's interests
with national security concerns. Striking this balance is the most
valuable contribution the judiciary makes to protecting what terrorists
threaten most.
consideration, however, was providing the defendant a fair trial under challenging
circumstances. See David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent,
74 DENY. U. L. REV. 941, 953 (1997).
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